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Abstract
This paper analyzes currency union integration by testing whether price levels
in member countries possess a common stochastic trend. The trace statistic test
for cointegration proposed by Johansen (1995) demonstrates the presence of such
a trend for most unions. A disaggregated analysis identifies a common stochastic
trend for several though fewer than half of country pairs within a union, partic-
ularly compared to the set of country pairs not in unions. Some unions such as
the Eurozone have small shares of cointegrated country pairs. Relative to countries
outside currency unions, the share of cointegrated country pairs is large. Compar-
ison to a control group (country pairs where one country belongs to a given union
and the other country does not) indicates that the cointegration found within a
currency union is a union-specific trait and not a feature of the individual countries
∗gregorywhitten@ln.edu.hk, Assistant Professor, Lingnan University, Department of Economics. I
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without permission
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within the union. These results provide an alternative metric to intra-union trade
for gauging the extent of currency union integration.
1 Introduction
Intraunion trade flows have long been used to gauge the extent to which countries within a
currency union are integrated (See Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002), for example).
However, recent work has called into question the reliability of this approach for charac-
terizing currency unions. Glick and Rose (2015) revisit earlier work exploring the effect of
a common currency on trade. Building on recent innovations to estimating bilateral trade
flows with gravity equations, the authors conclude that “it is currently beyond our ability
to estimate the effect of currency unions on aggregate trade with much confidence,” (p.
19). Furthermore, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) have suggested considering a wider
range of criteria, beyond aggregate, intraunion trade, by which to characterize currency
union formation and operation. One possible criterion, used in other studies of economic
integration, is the co-movement of aggregate price levels in the union’s member countries.
Such co-movements would suggest the existence of a well-defined and unified market, a
hallmark of an integrated economy. The goal of this paper is to investigate, for all cur-
rency unions, the extent to which prices are well-integrated; that is to say, does the price
index of a currency union country co-move with the price indices of fellow currency union
member countries in a manner consistent with the union’s fixed exchange rate?1
Examining price co-movements as a measure of integration emerges easily from con-
sidering trade flows as a measure of integration. Previous work has shown that the
1See page 38 for a list of currency unions and their members.
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extent of trade integration within a currency union varies across the set of unions; de-
pends largely on the tariff structure operating within the currency union countries; and is
greater for manufacturing goods than for agricultural goods (See Whitten (2013), Whit-
ten (2014), and Glick and Rose (2015)). More opportunities for trade should permit
more opportunities for low-cost producers in one currency union member country to sell
into markets with relatively-higher cost producers within the currency union, leading to
greater trade. Thus, any productivity gains in one country within a currency union that
is well-integrated through trade should lead to slower growth in prices for that country
and manifest itself throughout the entire currency union. Such active trading should lead
the prices of goods to attain a common level and/or growth rate throughout the union.
These effects on prices are not only a feature of currency unions but a necessary attribute
for the long-run maintenance of the fixed exchange rate that defines the currency union.
To argue that price co-movements can serve as a reliable metric for the integration
of currency unions requires demonstrating the following statements. First, price levels
among currency union members move together. Second, price levels among countries
outside currency unions do not move together or move together to a lesser extent than
those within a currency union. Third, the co-movements identified among currency union
countries are a consequence of the union itself and not of country-specific traits that could
manifest themselves in relation to countries outside the currency union in question.
This paper accomplishes these tasks by testing price levels for a cointegrating vector
using the Johansen (1995) approach. To accomplish the first statement, this paper tests
for the presence of a cointegrating vector among the price levels of the currency union’s
member countries: “multilateral” cointegration. The results show that most, though not
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all, currency unions possess a cointegrating vector among their members. This finding
definitely suggests a high level of economic convergence within the union, but does not
demonstrate that this level of convergence is unique to currency unions or surpasses
convergence found outside unions. Furthermore, characteristics of certain currency unions
complicate testing for long-run behavior. Several currency unions (e.g., the CFA zones
in Africa, the East Caribbean Currency Union) comprise developing economies for which
the availability of data is limited. Additionally, entrances into and exits out of unions
(e.g., countries adopting the US dollar on an ad hoc basis) can shorten the timespan over
which the cointegration test can examine a union’s entire membership. As a result, the
multilateral approach may be insufficient to establish price co-movements as a reliable
metric to characterize currency union integration.
To overcome these problems and to demonstrate the second and third statements,
the paper replicates the finding of union-wide cointegration by testing for cointegation
on a pairwise basis for all unique pairs of countries within a particular currency union:
“bilateral cointegration.” The results show that currency unions with a cointegrating
vector at the multilateral level have a high share of country pairs that exhibit cointegration
while currency unions without a cointegrating vector at the multilateral level have a low
share of country pairs that exhibit cointegration. This replication allows for considering
2 control groups in order to distinguish currency unions from other groups of countries.
The first control group consists of all country pairs where neither country belongs to a
currency union. The second control group consists of all country pairs where exactly one
country belongs to a particular currency union and the other country does not belong
to that particular currency union: “partial” currency unions. The second control group
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is designed to test whether or not the finding of cointegration at the multilateral level
is truly a consequence of the union itself or reflects country-specific features. As most
currency unions consist of small, open economies, these countries (as well as other small,
open economies) might exhibit cointegration in their price levels with the price levels
of many other economies inside or outside the currency union. Finding large rates of
cointegration among the partial unions would indicate the latter while a low rate of
cointegration among the partial unions would indicate the former.
This paper also shows that even if price levels for some countries within a currency
union lack cointegration, the growth in the price level of currency union country responds,
in a Granger causal sense, to growth from the price level of another union member.
However, Granger causality in price levels does not happen more frequently within a
currency union than does it happen outside a currency union.
Consequently, several currency unions exhibit at least one feature of a single, well-
integrated economy. As previous work has described, the extent of this integration differs
tremendously across the set of unions. Therefore, the finding that some currency unions
demonstrate little or no cointegration of overall price levels may be unsurprising. A more
surprising result is that a common stochastic trend exists on a bilateral basis rarely for
more than half of all country pairs. However surprising this result may be, it argues for
a high level of integration, relative to countries outside currency unions, among currency
union countries. This conclusion arises from the finding that country pairs not sharing
a common currency possess a common stochastic trend even more rarely (approximately
7% of all pairs). That rate of cointegration is comparable to the rates for the “partial”
unions consisting of country pairs where one country belongs to a particular currency
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union and the other pair does not. Hence, currency union pairs are cointegrated far more
frequently than are non-currency union pairs by comparison. This finding is an attribute
of the union itself and does not reflect idiosyncratic characteristics of the currency union
members.
This paper also considers an alternative explanation to the cointegration findings,
that they arise from the Penn or Balassa-Samuelson effect: the income and price levels of
a country are positively correlated. Hence, co-movements in prices over time may be the
consequence of income levels co-moving over time (See Lipsey et al. (1991)). Therefore,
the cointegration findings in this paper for currency unions may not indicate greater
integration but may be a consequence of income growth. To address this concern, the
paper analyzes the averages over time of cross-sectional standard deviations of income.
If the dynamic co-movement of prices reflects a consistent, dynamic growth of income,
then income levels across a currency union at any moment in time should not be “too
spread out.” If this low variance persists over time, then the average of the standard
deviations (to measure the range of income) should be low: a negative correlation between
the extent of price co-movement over time (the rates of cointegration) and the average
over time of cross-sectional standard deviations. The paper finds that though there is
a negative correlation, its weak value makes the Balassa-Samuelson effect an unlikely,
primary explanation for the cointegration findings.
The overall extent of integration suggested by the results in this paper concurs with
the extent of integration found in previous work for some unions such as the UEMOA
and ECCU (Whitten (2013) and Whitten (2014)). Other unions (CEMAC and dollarized
countries) exhibit a common stochastic trend overall but are poorly-integrated through
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trade (Whitten (2013), Klein (2005), and Gulde and Tsangarides (2008)). Dollarized
countries as well as the Eurozone have few instances of country pairs within the unions
demonstrating cointegration. This result may be expected as Whitten (2013) indicates
that these unions appear to be little integrated by trade. However, though Gulde and
Tsangarides (2008) and Whitten (2013) also indicate that the CEMAC is little integrated
by trade, this paper finds that over half of the country pairs within the CEMAC exhibit
cointegration. The anchor-client relationship of India and Bhutan appears to be well-
integrated by trade and demonstrates Granger causality but lacks cointegration.
Although this paper may be the first work to compare the behavior of price dynamics
across the set of all currency unions, it is not the first to use price dynamics to study
the extent of integration within a set of countries. The prospect of a single European
market prompted research that investigates inflation patterns across areas using a sim-
ilar currency, often using American price behavior at the city or state level to provide
a benchmark against which to compare the emergence of an integrated market within
the Eurozone. Certainly, the economic links among cities and states/provinces within a
country likely differ from the links among countries. However, characterizing these links
provides a reference point, presumably an upper bound, against which we can gauge cur-
rency union integration.2 Cecchetti et al. (2002) conduct unit root tests on regional CPIs
within the United States in order to envision “the likely nature of inflation convergence
in the euro area,” (p. 1081). The authors find that the half-life of a price shock within
the United States is approximately nine years, a surprisingly large amount of time for an
economy thought to be as well-integrated as the United States. Canova and Pappa (2007)
2I thank an anonymous referee for reminding me of this distinction.
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look at the dynamics of price indices in response to fiscal shocks in American states and
European countries in order to obtain a benchmark standard of what constitutes integra-
tion. Rogers (2007) examines the dispersion of individual goods’ prices as well as of price
indices. Comparing the dispersion of prices in European cities with the dispersion of
prices in American cities, the paper concludes that the preparations for the euro reduced
price dispersion, that dispersion has not decreased since 1998, and that price dispersion
is still larger in the Eurozone than in the United States. Faber and Stokman (2009) find
slightly greater integration than does Rogers (2007) for both tradable and non-tradable
goods. Crucini et al. (2012) uses product level data to test for the Law of One Price
within the United States.
The justification for using inflation patterns within the United States to forecast, in
a very general sense, the nature of inflation convergence in the Eurozone, arises from the
United States being “a mature common currency area of similar regional diversity, size,
and industrial development,” (Cecchetti et al. (2002), p. 1081). A similar examination
using the other currency unions operating in the world also provides a useful comparison.
Like the Eurozone countries, the member nations of other currency unions are sovereign
states that retain a large degree of fiscal autonomy. Therefore, examining movements
of price indices within a currency union and comparing those movements for all cur-
rency unions (Eurozone and others) provides an instructive lesson regarding price level
convergence over an area using the same currency but consisting of multiple countries.
The European Monetary Union (EMU) has received arguably the largest amount
of attention of any currency union on the subject of price convergence. Research in
this area has often but not always used cointegration methods to study price dynamics.
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Hagen and Fratianni (1990) and Kirchgo¨ssner and Wolters (1993) test for cointegration
in order to verify whether or not members of the EMS (precursor to the EMU and
Eurozone) could follow a largely German-inspired monetary policy. Kocˇenda (2001) finds
the extent of cointegration in the 1990s between Germany and transitioning economies
in the 1990s from the former Soviet Union was rather low. Brada and Kutan (2001)
obtained similar results, though the authors found that new adherents to and propspective
candidates for the EU had higher levels of economic convergence with Germany. Brada
et al. (2005) consider not only Germany but France as well when examining the economic
convergence (measured by cointegration) between core EU members and transitioning
economies presenting themselves as EU candidates. Lopez and Papell (2012) develop a
novel panel technique to study economic convergence among EU members at key dates
before and after the introduction of the euro. The authors use their technique to reject,
weakly and strongly, the presence of a unit root in inflation patterns among EU countries.
The authors link the strength with which they reject the unit root to economic events.
E.g., the authors reject strongly the unit root hypothesis between 2005 and 2007 when
the authors conclude that EU economies have converged. However, the authors can reject
the unit root hypothesis only weakly after 2008, attributing the shock of the financial
crisis to their findings.
Surprisingly, it appears that few have undertaken the task of examining carefully
the pattern of price movements among the countries constituting a single currency union
other than the Eurozone. Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014) use product-level price data to
test for the Law of One Price and Purchasing Power Parity across a wide number of cities
and countries. Although several of these cities are in countries that belong to a currency
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union (e.g., Dakar, Singapore, Lisbon), the paper does not examine currency unions in
particular. Abdih and Tsangarides (2010) use cointegration and Granger causality tests,
also used here, in order to examine the two Communaute´ financie`re africaine (CFA)
zones (CEMAC and UEMOA), but only at a union-wide level rather than for individual
countries. More recently, Couharde et al. (2013) examines currency misalignment within
the CFA zones (the UEMOA and CEMAC) in terms of trade and GDP.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and
data used in this paper. Section 3 shows results when looking at the countries within a
currency union, one union at a time. Section 4 presents a disaggregated analysis that
looks at individual pairs of countries within a currency union as well as pairs where one
country belongs to a given currency union and the other country does not.
2 Methodology & Data
This paper’s contribution is an analysis of currency unions and their integration by ex-
amining inflation patterns among a given union’s member countries. Well-integrated
economic regions (such as the members of a currency union) should exhibit a common
inflation pattern over time, a pattern that is robust to unexpected and transient dis-
turbances. This economic concept of integration for a currency union of n countries
translates into a statistical test for a set of n coefficients, (β0, β1, . . . , βn) such that, on
average:
β0 + β1p1 + . . .+ βnpn = 0 (1)
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where pi denotes the log of the price level. Equation 1 states that the vector of coefficients
ensures that, on average, the linear combination of coefficients and price levels will be
stationary. To test for this vector, this paper uses the approach in Johansen (1995)
applied to the log of the Consumer Price Indices (CPIs). The CPIs approximate the
price level of the countries inside and outside currency unions. The Johansen (1995)
approach assumes a Gaussian distribution and uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation in
order to identify parameters from the following estimating equation:

∆p1t
...
∆pnt
 = pi0 + αβ′

p1t−1
...
pnt−1
+
l∑
i=2
pii

∆p1t−i
...
∆pnt−i
+ t (2)
where l is the lag-length of the system, αβ′ is an n×n matrix consisting of 2 n×r matrices
(where r represents the number of cointegrating vectors) and the remaining pii are n× n
matrices. The Johansen procedure normalizes one coefficient in the cointegrating vector
to 1 and may impose other coefficients to be 0. β1 will denote in this paper the coefficient
normalized to 1.
The choice of the lag length plays a key role in testing for cointegration (see Reimers
(1992) and Boswijk and Franses (1992)). This paper chooses the lag length in a manner
similar to that followed by Rapach and Wohar (2002) and Baharumshah et al. (2010).
First, the varsoc command in Stata estimates VARs on the data for lag lengths varying
from 1 to 5. 5 is the maximum number used by Rapach and Wohar (2002) whose data, like
the data in this paper, are measured at quarterly frequencies. Next, given the results, the
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lag length for the Johansen procedure is the length that minimizes the Schwarz’s Bayesian
Information Criterion (SBIC) for the above-mentioned VARs. The Stata manual cites
Lu¨tkepohl (2005) in stating that “the SBIC or the HQIC provides consistent estimates of
the true lag order,” while “minimizing the [Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)] ... will
overestimate the true lag order with positive probability, even with an infinite sample
size.”3 Consequently, SBIC appears to be preferable to AIC. Given the lag length implied
by the SBIC, the vecrank command in Stata estimates equation 2 for r cointegrating
vectors where r is also dictated by the results from the vecrank test.
Given the cointegration estimates, what inferences are possible regarding the extent
(if any) of integration within a currency union? Suppose that a currency union has 2
countries (as is the case for Singapore-Brunei and India-Bhutan). If such a union were
perfectly integrated then the trend of the price level in one country would just offset the
trend in the price level of the other country. I.e., the cointegrating vector for this union
would be (1,−1). Note that this is the same result one would find if absolute Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) held for a fixed exchange rate equal to 1 between the two countries.
Suppose, more realistically, that a currency union had more than 2 countries. It is
not immediately obvious which values of the coefficients would indicate a large level of
integration. Certainly, as price levels tend to rise over time, any positive coefficient for
one country’s price level should be offset by a negative coefficient for another country’s
price level. Beyond these expectations on the signs of the coefficients, it is not obvious
which values the coefficients should take. Given that β1 is normalized to 1, the results
will test each coefficient of the cointegrating vector against a null hypothesis of β = −1
3Accessed online at http://www.stata.com/manuals13/tsvarsoc.pdf, p. 3
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as well as β = 1, those values being chosen as reasonable benchmarks for measuring the
extent to which the price levels of countries respond to movements in the price levels
of other countries. If a coefficient were significantly different from 0 but insignificantly
different from -1 it would counteract with equal weight the (presumably upward) long-run
trend of p1 (as β1 is normalized to 1). If a coefficient were significantly different from 0
but insignificantly different from 1, it would reinforce the (presumably upward) long-run
trend of p1. It is important to consider differing significantly from 0 because relying
merely on a failure to reject a null of β = 1 or β = −1 would not rule out cases where a
large standard error would admit 0 as a possible value for the coefficient.
Analyzing the long-run behavior of price levels for a group of countries requires as
long of a span of data for the countries in question as is possible. If data for one or
more countries are unavailable for certain length of time (a frequent phenomenon for
developing economies who are the majority of countries in currency unions), then testing
for cointegration over the full membership of the currency union becomes less reliable.
Changes in the currency union’s membership over time because of countries joining or
leaving further complicates the problem. This paper proposes 2 remedies for this problem.
First, note that the bilateral analysis where a currency union is seen as a set of country
pairs ensures that the full timespan of data is used to study price level dynamics. For
example, if a union consisted of 3 countries for 40 years and recorded data existed for 2
of the 3 countries for the 40 years but the 3rd country possessed data only for 20 years,
the cointegration test for the full currency union (multilateral analysis) could take place
only over 20 years of data. With the bilateral analysis, the full 40 years of data could
be used to study the pairwise movements in price levels for the first 2 countries. More
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information should provide a more reliable characterization of the currency union. A
second remedy is to test a currency union for cointegration multiple times but changing
the exact composition of the countries each time. The first test will be on the entire
currency union membership. Each subsequent test drops one country at a time, the
country with the smallest number of observations. The process verifies the sensitivity
of the results and permits obtaining a longer sample period of data. The longer sample
period should improve the power of the test, facilitating a rejection of the null hypothesis
of no cointegration. The cost of this procedure is that removing a country may remove a
price level that plays a key role in identifying a common stochastic trend throughout the
currency union.
Another remedy for the small T problem is to increase artificially the number of
observations by increasing the frequency of the observations (quarterly versus yearly or
monthly versus quarterly). Brada et al. (2005) and Lopez and Papell (2012) use monthly
data for their rolling procedures. However, the higher the frequency of the data, the
more likely that high-frequency noise might infect the data and obscure the existence
of a cointegrating vector. Given these trade-offs, this paper uses the CPI measured
at quarterly frequencies and published in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
database, 1948-2014. Identification of currency union membership comes from Glick and
Rose (2002) with updates from IMF Staff Reports.
3 Currency union-wide investigation
This section reports results from cointegration tests for the log of the CPI for member
countries within a currency union. The results are reported in tables 1 through 11. The
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tables list the estimated coefficients for the cointegrating vector, the standard errors, and
3 Z-scores for different null hypotheses: β = 0, β = 1, and β = −1. Recall that the
Johansen approach normalizes the coefficient for one country to 1. Consequently, there
is no standard error for this coefficient. A 0 with no standard error implies that the
Johansen procedure normalized that coefficient to 0. A blank entry in the column for βˆ
means that the country is not included in the test over the time-period specified by the
column.
Table 1: Currency unions with no cointegrating vectors
Time-period 1976Q3 - 1990Q4 2003Q4 - 2014Q1 2000Q2 - 2013Q4
Countries Australia Bhutan Brunei Darussalam
Tonga India Singapore
Most currency unions possess a cointegrating vector, though the results are sensitive
to the composition of countries and time frame examined. Among the smaller unions
described in table 1, none exhibit cointegrating relationships. The time span for which
data are available may be small, particularly for India-Bhutan and Brunei-Singapore.
Given that cointegration is a long-run property, the absence of cointegration for the
India-Bhutan and for Singapore-Brunei may be a consequence of the short length of
time over which data are available. However, India-Bhutan and Brunei-Singapore have
operated for several decades, during which price levels should have adjusted and converged
to overcome any long-run disturbances. Furthermore, Whitten (2013) shows that India
and Bhutan were well integrated by trade, even conditioning on tariffs. Therefore, it is
surprising that the price disturbances in each union are sufficient to prevent the rejection
of the null of no cointegration even when examined with a short span of recent data.
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Table 2: Time periods examined for EMU cointegration
2008q2 - 2013q4
2007q2 - 2013q4
2005q3 - 2013q4
2004q3 - 2013q4
2002q3 - 2013q4
2000q3 - 2014q2
More surprisingly may be the absence of cointegration from the European union,
particularly when compared with the results of Brada et al. (2005) and Lopez and Papell
(2012), even after examining six different periods of time (see table 2). On one hand,
the relatively short existence of the euro may explain the absence of cointegration as the
result of a small sample of time. On the other hand, EMU member countries have a long
history of aligning their exchange rates. Unexpectedly, this history seems to have had no
effect on inducing a common pattern of inflation across EMU member countries.
Table 3: Cointegrating vectors for the Rand zone
1973q2 - 1997q1
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Lesotho 1.0
Swaziland -2.054 0.362 -5.68 -8.44 -2.913
South Africa 1.057 0.364 2.9 0.156 5.65
The Rand zone, described in table 3, exhibits cointegration. The coefficient for South
Africa’s price level is significantly different from 0 and insignificantly different from 1.
The coefficient for Swaziland is -2.054, implying that Swaziland’s price level counteracts
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the approximately-equally weighted movements in the price levels for South Africa and
Lesotho.
The CEMAC, results for which are in tables 4-6, show that cointegration exists over
multiple spans of time and for multiple subsets of the union. From the early-to-mid 1980s
to the first quarter of 2014, the results indicate that the price levels of CEMAC member
countries move together. However, the movements of individual countries are generally
not of equal magnitude, as demonstrated by the coefficients of the cointegrating vector
that are largely different from 1 or -1. The exceptions to this pattern occur during the time
period of 1984q3 to 2014q1. The coefficient for Cameroon, 0.682, is significantly different
from 0 while the Z-score against a null-hypothesized value of 1 is rather small in absolute
value, suggesting borderline insignificance. A similar result applies for the coefficient
on Chad, -1.323, when compared with a hypothesized value of -1. The coefficient on
Gabon is insignificant. Hence, movements in Chad’s price level tend to counteract the
combination of price movements from Cameroon and the Central African Republic.
The CFA Franc was devalued against the French franc in 1995 (see Masson and Pattillo
(2005)). Hence, consider the time-series of data in 2 parts (pre- and post-devaluation) for
the CEMAC as well as for the UEMOA. Generally speaking, cointegration occurs both
before and after the devaluation, though the pattern of the coefficients on the cointegrat-
ing vector changes noticeably before and after the devaluation. The cointegrating vector
for 1985q2 - 1994q4 (see table 5) imposes a 0 coefficient on Cameroon. The coefficient on
Chad, -1.073, is significantly different from 0 but insignificantly different from -1 while the
other coefficients are largely insignificant. This result is comparable to the time period
of 1984q3 to 2014q1 discussed earlier.
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Table 4: Cointegrating vectors for the CEMAC
1981q3 - 2014q1 1984q3 - 2014q1 1985q2 - 2014q1
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Central African Republic 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cameroon 0.524 0.174 3.01 -2.737 8.752 0.682 0.21 3.25 -1.514 8.015 0.0
Republic of the Congo
Gabon -2.041 0.281 -7.27 -10.835 -3.708 -0.306 0.312 -0.98 -4.186 2.225 0.0
Equatorial Guinea 0.454 0.204 2.22 -2.671 7.116
Chad -1.323 0.2 -6.63 -11.64 -1.619 -1.615 0.293 -5.51 -8.921 -2.099
Table 5: Cointegrating vectors for the CEMAC (continued)
1981q3 - 1994q4 1984q3 - 1994q4 1985q2 - 1994q4
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Central African Republic 1.0 1.0
Cameroon 0.142 0.139 1.02 -6.17 8.208 0.0
Republic of the Congo
Gabon -0.358 0.202 -1.77 -6.708 3.175 -0.334 0.185 -1.81 -7.223 3.604
Equatorial Guinea -0.094 0.159 -0.59 -6.888 5.706
Chad -1.337 0.176 -7.61 -13.295 -1.92 -1.073 0.194 -5.53 -10.676 -0.375
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Table 6: Cointegrating vectors for the CEMAC (continued)
1996q2 - 2014q1 1998q2 - 2014q1
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Central African Republic 1.0
Cameroon -2.16 0.366 -5.9 -8.627 -3.167
Republic of the Congo 0.767 0.14 5.48 -1.67 12.64
Gabon -1.021 0.226 -4.51 -8.937 -0.091
Equatorial Guinea 0.281 0.105 2.67 -6.833 12.171
Chad -0.067 0.09 -0.75 -11.915 10.418
Table 7: Cointegrating vectors for the Dollarized zone
1973q2 - 1987q4 1973q3 - 2014q2 1957q3 - 2014q2
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Bahamas 1.0 1.0
Dominican Republic 0.0 -0.198 0.048 -4.09 -24.714 16.539 1.0
Guatemala -0.127 0.033 -3.89 -34.595 26.811
Panama 0.014 0.172 0.08 -5.735 5.899 -0.391 0.293 -1.33 -4.74 2.076 2.048 1.313 1.56 0.798 2.321
USA -0.711 0.156 -4.56 -10.984 1.855 -0.295 0.308 -0.96 -4.207 2.289 -3.736 0.869 -4.3 -5.447 -3.147
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Examining a time period following devaluation, 1998q2 - 2014q1 (see table 6), the
coefficient on Cameroon is -2.16 and significantly different from 0. The coefficient on
Chad, in contrast, is insignificantly different from 0. The coefficient for the Republic
of Congo, 0.767, is significantly different from 0 and borderline insignificantly different
from 1. The coefficient for Gabon, -1.021, is also significantly different from 0 and in-
significantly different from -1. The coefficient for Equatorial Guinea is also significantly
different from 0 but also significantly different from 1 or -1. Although the devaluation
did not prevent the price levels of CEMAC countries from regaining a stable, long-run
relationship, the results indicate that the role and importance of individual countries has
changed following the devaluation. Transitioning from one type of long-run relationship
among price levels to another long-run relationship among price levels may explain the
absence of a cointegrating vector immediately following the devaluation (1996q2-2014q1)
even though it has merely 8 more quarters than does the time period of 1998q2 - 2014q1
when cointegration is present.
The results for dollarized countries (table 7) show cointegration over several, long
durations. In most cases, the coefficients indicate that the price levels of countries sharing
the US dollar do not move in equal measure. Most coefficients that are significantly
different from 0 are also significantly different from 1 and from -1.
The ECCU exhibits cointegration over multiple time periods of varying lengths (see
tables 8 - 9). In the shortest and most recent time period, 1998q2 - 2013q4, all coefficients
are significantly different from 0, except the coefficient for St. Lucia. 3 countries (Antigua
& Barbuda, Grenada, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines) have coefficients that are
significantly different from 0 but insignificantly different from -1. The coefficient on
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Table 8: Cointegrating vectors for the ECCU
1998q2 - 2013q4 1980q2 - 2013q4
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Anguilla 1.0
Antigua & Barbuda -0.966 0.266 -3.63 -7.388 0.129
Dominica 3.077 0.452 6.8 4.593 9.016 1.0
Grenada -1.299 0.387 -3.36 -5.946 -0.774 -3.33 0.411 -8.1 -10.527 -5.665
St. Kitts & Nevis -0.625 0.18 -3.47 -9.016 2.079 1.49 0.211 7.07 2.327 11.817
St. Lucia -0.13 0.191 -0.68 -5.93 4.562 -0.276 0.297 -0.93 -4.298 2.438
St. Vincent & the Grenadines -0.719 0.241 -2.98 -7.134 1.168 0.743 0.447 1.66 -0.574 3.9
Table 9: Cointegrating vectors for the ECCU (continued)
1979q2 - 2013q4 1976q3 - 2013q4
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Anguilla
Antigua & Barbuda
Dominica
Grenada 1.0
St. Kitts & Nevis -0.347 0.077 -4.5 -17.457 8.457 1.0
St. Lucia -0.175 0.112 -1.56 -10.471 7.345 -0.322 0.366 -0.88 -3.61 1.85
St. Vincent & the Grenadines -0.316 0.108 -2.92 -12.149 6.313 -0.513 0.381 -1.35 -3.967 1.277
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Dominica, 3.077, is significantly different from 0 as well as from 1. Hence, three countries
each of whose coefficients is approximately -1 as well as one more country (St. Kitts
& Nevis: -0.625) counteract the influence of one country (Dominica) with a coefficient
approximately equal to 3 plus the influence of a country with a coefficient normalized to
1 (Anguilla).
The UEMOA, as is the case with its fellow CFA member the CEMAC, (see tables
10 - 11) displays cointegration over nearly all time periods examined. As is the case
with the CEMAC, these results suggest a change after 1994 in how movements in the
price levels of different countries in the UEMOA respond in order to maintain a stable
price level. The third panel of table 10 and the first panel of table 11 indicate that both
before and after the devaluation of the CFA franc, price levels in the member countries
move together. Considering the latter case, 2 countries (Coˆte d’Ivoire and Mali) have
coefficients that are significantly different from 0 but insignificantly different from -1.
Senegal’s coefficient is 1.528, significantly different from 0 (as well as from 1). Hence, the
sum of price level movements in Burkina Faso and Senegal counteract the sum of price
level movements from Coˆte d’Ivoire and Mali while Niger has a small and insignificant
effect on the cointegrating vector.
The second panel of table 11 examines a set of countries nearly identical to those
in the first panel of the same table.4 Burkina Faso maintains a normalized coefficient
of 1. However, the coefficient for Coˆte d’Ivoire is now positive, smaller in magnitude,
and borderline significant. Niger and Senegal now each have significant and negative
coefficients. Hence, the sum of price level movements in Burkina Faso and Coˆte d’Ivoire
4The coefficient for Benin is normalized to 0, rendering the situation comparable to that for 1988q1
to 2014q2 where Benin is excluded.
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Table 10: Cointegrating vectors for the UEMOA
1968q2 - 1994q4 1970q2 - 1994q4 1968q3 - 2014q2
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Benin
Burkina Faso 1.0 1.0
Cote d’Ivoire 0.774 0.429 1.8 -0.525 4.133 -0.511 0.065 -7.86 -23.243 7.527
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Niger 1.608 0.369 4.36 1.651 7.076 -0.231 0.056 -4.13 -22.035 13.778
Senegal 1.228 0.397 3.1 0.575 5.617 -0.072 0.084 -0.87 -12.835 11.1
Togo -4.737 0.73 -6.49 -7.859 -5.119
Table 11: Cointegrating vectors for the UEMOA (continued)
1988q1 - 2014q2 1996q2 - 2014q2 1997q2 - 2014q2
βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for βˆ Standard Z-score for Z-score for Z-score for
Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1 Error H0 : β = 0 H0 : β = 1 H0 : β = −1
Benin 0.0 0.0
Burkina Faso 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cote d’Ivoire -0.924 0.14 -6.59 -13.727 0.544 0.209 0.131 1.6 -6.054 9.245 0.014 0.117 0.12 -8.464 8.702
Guinea-Bissau 0.597 0.092 6.5 -4.388 17.394
Mali -1.207 0.204 -5.93 -10.834 -1.018 0.139 0.185 0.75 -4.642 6.143 -0.173 0.166 -1.04 -7.072 4.99
Niger -0.091 0.154 -0.59 -7.073 5.89 -0.624 0.218 -2.87 -7.465 1.728 -0.89 0.199 -4.48 -9.517 0.552
Senegal 1.528 0.255 5.99 2.071 9.914 -1.058 0.217 -4.88 -9.493 -0.267 -0.889 0.188 -4.72 -10.037 0.589
Togo
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counteract the sum of price level movements from Niger and Senegal while Mali has a
small and insignificant effect on the cointegrating vector. As was the case in the CEMAC,
devaluation appears to be associated with a rearranging of which countries counteract
which other countries to maintain stable inflation patterns within the currency union.
The results in this section indicate that within a given currency union, countries attain
stable inflation dynamics when some countries have positive coefficients (by normalization
or otherwise) that accentuate growth in the price level while the negative coefficients on
the price levels of other countries counteract that effect. Hence, it seems that countries
sharing a common currency have price levels that move together. However, there are
limitations to this conclusion. First, there are several cases where countries must be
dropped in order to compute a cointegrating vector in a given time period. Therefore, the
results may not be generalizable to the entire union. Second, the union-wide cointegration
analysis finds no cointegrating vector for the EMU despite a long history of economic
interaction among EMU member countries. Third, although these results demonstrate
that the price levels of countries within a currency union move together, the results do not
say that this comovement is unique to currency union countries or occurs more frequently
among countries in a currency union than among countries not in a currency union.
To address some of these limitations, the next section will examine cointegration on
a bilateral basis. Instead of looking at a currency union directly as a single entity, the
bilateral analysis permits examining the union as a set of country pairs. As the bilateral
analysis requires the availability of data for just 2 countries instead of more than 2
countries (the requirement for the multilateral analysis), it permits analyzing the price
levels over longer periods of time. The examination takes place for pairs of countries that
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share a common currency as well as for pairs of countries using different currencies. For
country pairs where each country uses a distinct currency, the test for cointegration is
among price levels and the exchange rates. The theory of PPP dictates that if a common
stochastic trend governs the price levels in a pair of countries, it should also govern a
trend for the exchange rate. Ignoring the exchange rate component would lead to biased
estimates. The next section follows a methodology similar to the methodology used by
Berkowitz et al. (1998) of conducting cointegration tests on country pairs followed by
Granger causality tests on those pairs. To understand if a given country has a particular
influence on the price movements of another country within the union, the next section
will report results from Granger causality tests on the price levels in country pairs.5 This
provides an extra dimension for understanding price dynamics across countries.
4 Bilateral Investigation
This section reports results from pairwise tests of cointegration and Granger causality for
the log of the CPI. Table 12 shows the share of country pairs within each currency union
that exhibit cointegration in the log of the CPI as well as the shares of Granger causality
from the price level in one country to the price level in another.
Most currency unions consist of pairs of countries between which cointegration ex-
ists. Unions with zero or low rates of cointegration (the Australia zone, India-Bhutan,
Singapore-Brunei, and the Eurozone) are unions lacking a multilateral cointegrating vec-
tor. Hence, the bilateral analysis generally confirms that found in the multilateral analy-
5For country pairs not in currency unions, I test only the null hypothesis that the lags of p1 do not
Granger cause the current value of p2. I do not consider an exchange rate Granger causing price levels.
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Table 12: Frequencies (%) of cointegration and Granger Causality within currency unions
Currency Union Cointegration Granger Causality
Australia zone 0.00 0.00
CEMAC 64.71 58.82
Dollarized zone 40.00 38.00
ECCU 36.67 35.00
Eurozone 19.66 32.91
India-Bhutan 0.00 100.00
Rand zone 33.33 33.33
Singapore-Brunei 0.00 0.00
UEMOA 50.00 62.50
A country pair not in a currency union 7.00 42.80
sis. The unions have rates of cointegration noticeably higher than the rate found among
pairs of countries where neither country belongs to a currency union (7%). Interestingly,
the currency union with the largest frequency of cointegration is the CEMAC (%64.17).
Previous work has suggested that the CEMAC is the less integrated of the 2 CFA zones
when integration is measured by trade. (See Gulde and Tsangarides, 2008 and Whit-
ten (2013)). Half of the country pairs in the other CFA zone, the UEMOA, display
cointegration, indicating that it remains as one of the more-integrated currency unions.
The union with the next largest frequency of cointegration (%40) is the group of
countries sharing the U.S. Dollar. Surprisingly, this frequency of cointegration surpasses
the frequency of cointegration in the ECCU, the Eurozone, and the Rand zone. The
Eurozone has the lowest frequency of cointegration among any of the currency unions
with non-zero instances of cointegration. This result may not be surprising in light of the
lack of a union-wide cointegrating vector from the previous section.
The cointegration results not only describe the nature of price movements within a
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currency union. They also inform how Granger causality tests should be conducted. If the
price levels are cointegrated for a given country pair, then the Granger causality test for
the price levels of that country pair should be conducted on the levels themselves. Lacking
cointegration, the Causality test is performed on first differences of the price levels, as
price level data that are not cointegrated are generally thought to be non-stationary in
levels but stationary in first differences. See Berkowitz et al. (1998) for more detail.
Rates of Granger Causality within currency unions are generally comparable to rates
of cointegration. A key difference is the frequency of Granger Causality between non-
currency union countries is much higher (42.8%) than is the frequency of cointegration
between non-currency union countries (7%). The interpretation of this result is that price
levels and exchange rates rarely follow a common stochastic trend. However, the change
in the price level for one country often influences the change in the price level for another
country. In fact, the influence of the price level in one country is more likely to affect the
price level in another country when both countries are outside a currency union than if
the pair of countries belongs to the Dollarized zone, ECCU, Eurozone, or Rand zone.
Although the results in table 12 generally confirm the results found in tables 1 through
11, there are some discrepancies. The cointegrating vectors found in the previous section
suggest that prices move together over time for most currency unions. Taken literally,
the numerous country pairs lacking cointegration, as demonstrated in table 12, suggest
that the currency union cannot continue operating in its current form in the future,
but is likely to fracture or dissolve. Possible explanations to reconcile the multilateral
and bilateral results include the following. First, the data-generating process for price-
level stability within the currency union may truly be multivariate instead of bivariate.
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While the bivariate analysis of currency union pairs does provide a convenient control
group against which to study the price dynamics of countries outside currency unions,
the bivariate analysis alone may not describe fully the evolution of price dynamics inside
a currency union. Hence, assembling an accurate depiction of price behavior throughout
the currency union from a set of country pairs within the currency union may not be
entirely feasible. Second, the cointegrating vectors found in the previous section over
long time horizons often are calculated after dropping one or more countries from the
analysis. Cointegrating vectors obtained for an entire set of currency union members
often were obtained over relatively short horizons. Although cointegration is a long-run
phenomenon, its presence over a short span of time does not rule out the possibility that
for the entire set of countries in the currency union, the time period in question happens
to be one of abnormally uniform growth in prices for all countries. For longer periods of
time, a common stochastic trend may prevail truly only for a subset of countries.
To understand the results in table 12 more clearly, table 15 presents country pairs
where there exists any price co-movement or causality. A separate appendix presents
country pairs lacking any link between price levels through cointegration of Granger
Causality. The column entitled “Coefficient for country 2” gives the cointegrating vector’s
coefficient for country 2 when the coefficient for country 1 is normalized to 1. The column
H0 : β2 = 0 reports the Z-statistic from a test of the coefficient against the null hypothesis
that β2 = 0. Similarly, the column H0 : β2 = −1 reports the Z-statistic from a test of the
coefficient against the null hypothesis that β2 = −1. As nearly all of the βˆ2 are negative,
the results dispense with tests against a null hypothesis of β2 = 1. A ←− indicates that
the price level in the second country indicated in the pair Granger causes the price level
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in the first country indicated in the pair. A −→ indicates that the price level in the first
country indicated in the pair Granger causes price level in the second country indicated in
the pair. A ←→ indicates causality in both directions. Recall from page 12 that perfect
integration in a bilateral context implies a cointegrating vector of (1,−1).
In the CEMAC, nearly all country pairs that demonstrate Granger Causality also
demonstrate cointegration. This result is largely consistent with the persistent finding
of cointegration at the union-wide level, shown in tables 4 through 6. However, only 2
country pairs demonstrate perfect comovement of price levels: Chad - Cameroon and Re-
public of Congo - Central African Republic. Madagascar is never cointegrated with any
other country or exhibits Granger Causality. Madagascar’s departure from the CEMAC
following treaty changes implemented by France in the 1970s may reveal a level of un-
suitability between Madagascar and the currency union (Masson and Pattillo (2005)).
Consequently, the lack of feedback between the price levels of other CEMAC countries
and Madagascar should not be too surprising.
In the ECCU, no country pair satisfies the conditions for perfect price comovement,
though there is a high frequency of cointegration. Some countries, notably St. Vincent
& the Grenadines, are frequently cointegrated with other ECCU members. The only
country with which St. Vincent & the Grenadines displays neither cointegration nor
Granger Causality is Montserrat. This result likely is more informative about Montserrat
than about St. Vincent & the Grenadines as Montserrat lacks cointegration and Granger
Causality with all countries except for Antigua & Barbuda where it displays both.
To put the bilateral results for the ECCU in correspondence with the multilateral
results in tables 8 and 9, consider the time period from 1998q2 to 2013q4. When the
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coefficient on Anguilla is normalized to 1, 3 countries (Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada, and
St. Vincent & the Grenadines) have coefficients that are significantly different from 0 and
insignificantly different from -1. On a bilateral basis, no country pair with Anguilla and
any of the 3 other countries listed demonstrates cointegration. The Antigua & Barbuda -
Grenada and Antigua & Barbuda - St. Vincent & the Grenadines pairs lacks cointegration
but demonstrates Granger Causality. Only the Grenada - St. Vincent & the Grenadines
pair demonstrates cointegration.
In the EMU, there are 3-5 country pairs that satisfy the criteria for exhibiting perfect
price comovement. These pairs frequently involve newer or periphery countries within
the EMU (notably Cyprus and Slovenia). Hence, these results may be anomalous rather
than indicative of true economic integration. Unsurprisingly, Montenegro, which adopted
the euro ad hoc, displays no co-movement in prices with the official members of the
EMU except for Cyprus. In contrast, larger economies where one might expect a close
relationship (such as Spain and Portugal or France and Germany) lack cointegration. On
one hand, the absence of cointegration even on a pairwise basis may be a consequence of
the euro’s relatively short existence (approximately 15 years) when compared to the other
monetary union currencies. However, other currency unions demonstrate cointegration
in price levels over time periods of similar length (the ECCU, the CEMAC, and the
UEMOA), undermining the short timespan as an explanation for the Eurozone’s results.
Also, given the long history of economic cooperation following World War II as well as
attempts to link the exchange rates among future Eurozone members prior to 1999, the
existence of cointegration for less than 20% of all country pairs is puzzling.
The Dollarized country pairs that demonstrate Granger Causality, like those in the
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CEMAC, also demonstrate cointegration. Some countries, such as El Salvador, are fre-
quently cointegrated with other countries. Other countries, such as the Dominican Re-
public, generally lack price co-movements with other countries. Although table 7 shows
a cointegrating vector from 1957q3 to 2014q2 for the Dominican Republic, Panama, and
the US, no 2 countries possess a cointegrating vector on a pairwise basis.
Although the UEMOA does not have the largest frequency of cointegration (50%,
behind the CEMAC with 65%) only one country pair (Burkina Faso and Niger) lacks any
pattern of price co-movement (either cointegration or Granger Causality). This relatively
large frequency of integration through price dynamics is consistent with the high extent
of trade integration for the UEMOA found in Whitten (2013). Country pairs containing
Coˆte d’Ivoire, a large economy within the UEMOA, rarely exhibit cointegration but
always exhibit Granger Causality.
Interestingly, the 3 countries (Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal) that regularly demon-
strate comparable price comovements in tables 10 and 11 have very different behavior on
a pairwise basis. Each of these 3 countries lacks cointegration on a bilateral basis with any
of the other countries, though Granger causality exists for the pairs that include Senegal.
Granger Causality exists in both directions for Senegal and Niger while Senegal Granger
causes the price level in Burkina Faso. Given that the influence of Burkina Faso’s price
level movement changes direction over time with respect to the movements of Niger and
Senegal after devaluation (see table 11), it may not be surprising that a pairwise exam-
ination with all available data yields no cointegration between Burkina Faso and either
Niger or Senegal. More puzzling is the lack of cointegration between Niger and Senegal
over the length of the sample, as the multilateral results indicate that the price levels in
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these countries move together both before and after the devaluation.
Clearly, more currency union pairs demonstrate price level comovements than do other
pairs where neither country belongs to a currency union. One interpretation of this result
is that the countries within a currency union genuinely represent a single, well-unified
market. Another interpretation, however, is that the individual countries comprising the
currency unions happen to possess individual characteristics that predispose their price
levels to adjust more easily than other countries.
To examine which interpretation is more likely, consider the rates of cointegration in
“partial currency unions” consisting of country pairs where exactly one country belongs
to a particular currency union and exactly one country does not belong to that particular
union. If individual countries possess characteristics that pre-dispose their price levels to
adjust more easily than do the price levels of other counties, then the rates of cointegration
should be comparable between the actual currency unions and the “partial” unions. In
some cases, a particular country pair may belong to 2 “partial” currency unions. For
example, the pair consisting of France and Liberia will belong to the “partial” EMU
as well as the “partial” Dollarized zone. For the anchor-client unions (Australia zone,
Dollarized Zone, India-Bhutan, Rand zone, and Singapore-Brunei), I exclude pairs that
contain the anchor and any country outside the union. As an example, Tonga is the only
country in the Australia zone other than Australia for which data exist. Consequently,
table 13 indicates that there exists no cointegration between Australia and Tonga while
6% of country pairs consisting of Tonga and any country other than Australia demonstrate
cointegration.
Cointegration in the “partial” unions is a rare phenomenon when compared with the
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Table 13: “Partial” currency unions: 1 country in the named union, one country outside
the named union
Currency Union Cointegration Granger Causality
Australia zone 6.0 33.10
CEMAC 7.0 41.08
Dollarized zone 8.0 45.90
ECCU 6.0 39.18
Eurozone 3.0 30.99
India-Bhutan 4.0 24.68
Rand zone 7.0 37.60
Singapore-Brunei 0.0 19.88
UEMOA 9.0 47.11
actual unions. The highest rate of cointegration for a partial union is with the members
of the UEMOA where 9% of pairs consisting of one UEMOA member and one non-
UEMOA country display cointegration. This frequency of cointegration resembles the
rate of cointegration among country pairs outside currency unions (7%). Hence, by this
metric, currency unions appear to be unified and well-formed. Price levels of a country
pair within the same currency union adjust together more readily than do the price levels
of 2 countries not in a currency union.
The Granger Causality results for the “partial” unions, however, do not distinguish
currency union countries from non-currency union countries to the same extent that
cointegration does. For some unions, the frequency of Granger Causality in the “partial”
union is smaller than is the frequency in the actual union (such as the CEMAC and the
UEMOA). However, the frequency of Granger Causality in some “partial” unions (such
as the Dollarized zone, the ECCU, the Rand zone, and the Eurozone) exceeds or rivals
the frequency of Causality in the corresponding actual union.
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Overall, the price levels in currency union countries evolve in a manner consistent
to the responses found in countries outside currency union countries. Unlike countries
outside currency unions, however, the price levels of countries within a currency union
move together at rates higher than those found outside currency unions. The fixed
exchange rates of currency union members are more (though not perfectly) aligned with
the price levels of the union’s member countries than are the floating exchange rates
aligned with the price levels of countries not sharing a common currency.
Could the results in the table be a consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect?6
Recall that this effect refers to the fact that there exists a positive correlation between
the price level of a country and its income level. If the incomes of a group of countries grow
together over time, their price levels will move together over time, too. Therefore, the high
rates of cointegration for countries in currency unions and the low rates of cointegration
for countries not in currency unions (the “none” group and the partial unions) may be
a consequence of the extent to which income levels vary within the groups in question.
To consider the possibility that the common trend in price level is a consequence of price
levels moving in tandem with income over time, table 14 presents the average, over time,
of cross-sectional standard deviations in GDP (levels and per capita).
The reason for considering the average, over time, of cross-sectional deviations in
income as a way verify if the cointegration results in table 12 are a result of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is as follows. A group of countries whose income levels move together
over time, rather than diverge, should have a low, average of the cross-sectional standard
deviation of income over time. Such a group of countries should be subject to the Balassa-
6I thank an anonymous referee for alerting me to the possibility of this effect as an explanation for
my results.
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Table 14: Correlations between the average over time of cross-sectional standard devi-
ations of GDP (constant US$, 2005) and cointegration rates (Data source: the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators)
Country group or GDP per capita GDP Level Cointegration rate
Currency Union
NONE 12933.32 4.33×1012 7.00
AUSTRALIA 16343.54 3.09×1011 0.00
UEMOA 320.57 3.95×1009 50.00
RAND 1190.31 1.99×1009 33.33
CEMAC 3240.30 3.80×1009 64.71
SINGAPORE-BRUNEI 9196.85 5.28×1010 0.00
DOLLARIZED 18727.64 2.94×1012 40.00
DENMARK 9052.41 1.37×1011 0.00
INDIA-BHUTAN 281.12 4.51×1011 0.00
ECCU 2413.93 1.73×1008 36.67
EMU 16519.10 9.30×1011 19.66
Correlation with the -0.33 -0.19
cointegration rate
Samuelson effect and, consequently, should see their prices move closely over time or be
cointegrated. In contrast, a group of countries with a strongly heterogeneous income
profile over time should demonstrate weak co-movement of prices. Therefore, if the results
in table 12 are a consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect instead of a measure of the
extent of integration within the currency union, then the lower the average of cross-
sectional standard deviations over time of income, the higher should be the frequency of
cointegration within the currency union: a negative correlation.
The correlation between the averages over time of cross-sectional standard deviations
and the rates of cointegration within currency unions is negative for both the level of GDP
(-0.19) and GDP per capita (-0.33), findings consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
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However, though the correlations may offer qualitative support to Balassa-Samuelson as
an explanation for the results in tables 12 and 13, the quantitative magnitude of the
correlations is particularly weak. Therefore, Balassa-Samuelson is an unlikely explanation
for the finding that countries in currency unions have prices that move together over time
in a way not found among countries that lack a common currency.
5 Conclusion
In order to understand better currency union operations, recent articles have suggested
expanding the criteria for characterizing currency unions beyond the value of intra-union
trade (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010)). This paper contributes to that discussion by
examining price level movements in currency union member countries. More specifically,
this paper tests whether price levels in member countries possess a common stochastic
trend.
The trace statistic test for cointegration proposed by Johansen (1995) demonstrates
that the price levels in most currency unions follow a common stochastic trend at the
union-wide level. Although the union-wide results demonstrate the existence of a long-
run and stable relationship among price levels, the nature of this relationship changes
over time. A disaggregated, bilateral analysis generally confirms the multilateral analysis
and indicates that non-trivial shares of individual country pairs within a currency union
lack a common trend. The bilateral analysis is necessary to show that price convergence
is a reliable, distinguishing feature of currency unions and not a trait peculiar to the
individual countries within the union. The bilateral analysis also permits the use of
longer lengths of data. Compared to the set of country pairs not in currency unions,
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the frequency is high. However, some unions such as the Eurozone and Rand zone have
unexpectedly small shares of country pairs exhibiting cointegration.
When examining country pairs for a currency union where one country belongs to the
union in question and one country does not, instances of a common stochastic trend are
much rarer. Consequently, price level convergence, as indicated by cointegation, serves
as a reliable metric to distinguish currency unions from other groups of countries. This
pattern is not an idiosyncratic trait of the countries constituting the currency union (as
indicated by the “partial” unions) but an attribute of the union itself.
These results provide an alternative metric to intra-union trade for gauging the extent
of integration within a currency union. These results are unlikely to be a consequence of
an unrelated phenomenon, such as the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The presence of a coin-
tegrating vector indicates that the member countries of several currency unions are more
integrated among themselves than are they with other countries. Left unanswered is why
coefficients for the cointegrating vector would change in magnitude or signs depending
on the time period analyzed. Future research will address this question.
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Appendix: Currency unions and their composition
East Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU)
Antigua and Barbuda Barbados (1965-1972)
Dominica St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines
West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
Be´nin Burkina Faso
Coˆte d’Ivoire Guinea-Bissau (1997-)
Mali Mauritania (1960-1973)
Niger Se´ne´gal
Togo
Communaute´ E´conomique et Mone´taire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC)
Cameroon Central African Republic
Chad Congo, Rep.
Equatorial Guinea (1985-) Gabon
Madagascar (1960-1972)
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European Monetary Union (EMU) / Euroized
Austria (1999-) Belgium (1999-)
Cyprus (2004-) Estonia (2004-)
France (1999-) Finland (1999-)
Germany (1999-) Greece (2001-)
Ireland (1999-) Italy (1999-)
Latvia (2005-) Luxembourg (1999-)
Macedonia (2002-) Malta (2005-)
Netherlands (1999-) Portugal (1999-)
Slovak Republic (2006-) Slovenia (2007-)
Spain (1999-)
Dollarized countries
American Samoa The Bahamas (1973-)
Bermuda Ecuador (2000-)
El Salvador (2001-) Guam
Liberia Marshall Islands
Federated States of Micronesia Northern Mariana Islands
Palau Panama
Puerto Rico Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Danish Krone zone
Denmark Færoe Islands Greenland
Australia zone
Australia Kiribati Tonga (until 1990)
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Table 15: Cointegration and Granger causality results
Currency Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated βˆ†2 Z-score for Z-score for Granger
Union H0 : β2 = 0 H0 : β2 = −1 Causality∗
BENELUX Luxembourg - Belgium No ←−
BENELUX Netherlands - Luxembourg No −→
CEMAC Central African Republic - Cameroon No ←→
CEMAC Chad - Cameroon Yes -1.104 -18.382 -1.725 ←−
CEMAC Chad - Central African Republic No −→
CEMAC Congo, Republic of - Cameroon Yes -1.453 -23.003 -7.177 ←−
CEMAC Congo, Republic of - Central African Republic Yes -1.105 -17.986 -1.714 ←→
CEMAC Congo, Republic of - Chad Yes -1.326 -9.163 -2.251 ←→
CEMAC Equatorial Guinea - Cameroon Yes -1.772 -24.02 -10.468 ←→
CEMAC Equatorial Guinea - Central African Republic Yes -1.775 -24.568 -10.725 −→
CEMAC Equatorial Guinea - Chad Yes -1.51 -21.502 -7.265 ←→
CEMAC Gabon - Cameroon No −→
CEMAC Gabon - Central African Republic Yes -0.776 -17.989 5.206 ←−
CEMAC Gabon - Chad Yes -0.628 -16.398 9.723 ←→
CEMAC Gabon - Congo, Republic of Yes -0.551 -18.187 14.834 −→
CEMAC Gabon - Equatorial Guinea Yes -0.411 -14.247 20.392 ←−
ECCU Dominica - Anguilla No −→
ECCU Dominica - Antigua and Barbuda No −→
ECCU Grenada - Antigua and Barbuda No ←−
ECCU Grenada - Dominica No −→
ECCU Montserrat - Antigua and Barbuda Yes -1.261 -58.643 -12.139 ←→
ECCU St. Kitts and Nevis - Anguilla Yes -0.869 -35.828 5.384 −→
ECCU St. Kitts and Nevis - Dominica Yes -1.798 -14.909 -6.619 −→
ECCU St. Kitts and Nevis - Grenada Yes -1.319 -26.122 -6.32 ←→
ECCU St. Lucia - Barbados Yes -2.197 -6.422 -3.499 ←−
ECCU St. Lucia - Dominica Yes -1.592 -18.848 -7.007 −→
ECCU St. Lucia - Grenada Yes -1.312 -18.32 -4.354 −→
ECCU St. Lucia - St. Kitts and Nevis Yes -0.817 -16.256 3.629 ←−
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Anguilla No −→
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Antigua and Barbuda No ←−
† Coefficient on country 1 normalized to 1 Continued on next page
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 15 – continued from previous page
Currency Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated βˆ†2 Z-score for Z-score for Granger
Union H0 : β2 = 0 H0 : β2 = −1 Causality∗
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Dominica Yes -1.57 -16.524 -6.002 None
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Grenada Yes -1.171 -23.141 -3.387 −→
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - St. Kitts and Nevis Yes -0.772 -28.093 8.308 ←→
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - St. Lucia No ←→
EMU Cyprus - Austria No −→
EMU Cyprus - Finland Yes -0.455 -4.948 5.933 −→
EMU Cyprus - France No −→
EMU Cyprus - Germany Yes -0.696 -4.148 1.815 −→
EMU Cyprus - Greece No ←−
EMU Cyprus - Italy Yes -0.855 -16.612 2.808 −→
EMU Cyprus - Luxembourg No −→
EMU Cyprus - Netherlands Yes -0.8 -9.444 2.367 −→
EMU Cyprus - Portugal No −→
EMU Cyprus - San Marino No −→
EMU Cyprus - Spain No −→
EMU Finland - Austria No −→
EMU Finland - France No ←−
EMU Finland - Germany No −→
EMU Finland - Netherlands No ←−
EMU France - Belgium No ←−
EMU Germany - Austria No ←→
EMU Germany - France No −→
EMU Greece - Austria Yes -1.851 -21.936 -10.084 ←→
EMU Greece - Belgium No ←−
EMU Greece - Finland No ←−
EMU Greece - Germany No ←→
EMU Greece - Italy No −→
EMU Greece - Luxembourg No ←→
EMU Greece - San Marino No ←−
EMU Ireland - Belgium No ←−
EMU Ireland - Finland No ←−
† Coefficient on country 1 normalized to 1 Continued on next page
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 15 – continued from previous page
Currency Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated βˆ†2 Z-score for Z-score for Granger
Union H0 : β2 = 0 H0 : β2 = −1 Causality∗
EMU Ireland - Germany Yes -0.306 -1.11 2.518 None
EMU Ireland - Greece No −→
EMU Ireland - Italy No ←−
EMU Ireland - San Marino No ←−
EMU Italy - France No −→
EMU Italy - San Marino No ←−
EMU Luxembourg - Germany No ←→
EMU Luxembourg - Italy No ←−
EMU Luxembourg - San Marino No ←−
EMU Montenegro - Austria No −→
EMU Montenegro - Cyprus Yes -1.119 -18.358 -1.946 ←−
EMU Montenegro - Germany No −→
EMU Montenegro - Ireland Yes -2.999 -7.168 -4.778 ←−
EMU Montenegro - Italy No −→
EMU Montenegro - Netherlands No −→
EMU Netherlands - Italy Yes -0.846 -33.474 6.091 ←−
EMU Netherlands - San Marino No ←→
EMU Portugal - Belgium No ←−
EMU Portugal - Germany Yes 0.362 0.879 3.305 None
EMU Portugal - Greece No ←−
EMU Portugal - Ireland No ←−
EMU Portugal - Italy No ←−
EMU San Marino - France No −→
EMU Slovenia - Austria Yes -0.826 -13.489 2.838 ←→
EMU Slovenia - Belgium Yes -0.82 -38.602 8.501 ←−
EMU Slovenia - Finland Yes -0.868 -29.208 4.439 ←−
EMU Slovenia - France Yes -1.274 -20.612 -4.438 ←→
EMU Slovenia - Germany Yes -1.239 -17.526 -3.38 ←−
EMU Slovenia - Greece No ←−
EMU Slovenia - Italy Yes -0.884 -25.127 3.298 ←−
EMU Slovenia - Luxembourg Yes -0.821 -15.323 3.34 ←−
† Coefficient on country 1 normalized to 1 Continued on next page
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 15 – continued from previous page
Currency Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated βˆ†2 Z-score for Z-score for Granger
Union H0 : β2 = 0 H0 : β2 = −1 Causality∗
EMU Slovenia - Montenegro No ←−
EMU Slovenia - Netherlands Yes -0.913 -13.172 1.257 ←−
EMU Slovenia - Portugal Yes -0.993 -20.148 0.141 ←−
EMU Slovenia - San Marino No ←→
EMU Slovenia - Spain Yes -0.921 -22.965 1.976 ←−
EMU Spain - Austria Yes -2.148 -11.882 -6.35 None
EMU Spain - Belgium Yes -3.319 -6.65 -4.646 None
EMU Spain - France No ←→
EMU Spain - Germany Yes -3.568 -9.682 -6.968 None
EMU Spain - Greece No ←−
EMU Spain - Ireland No ←→
EMU Spain - Portugal No ←→
INDIA-BHUTAN India - Bhutan No ←→
SOUTH AFRICA Namibia - South Africa Yes -1.033 -98.32 -3.132 ←−
SOUTH AFRICA Swaziland - Namibia Yes -1.128 -113.264 -12.896 −→
SOUTH AFRICA Swaziland - South Africa No ←→
USA Bahamas, The - Ecuador Yes -0.544 -51.786 43.402 −→
USA Bahamas, The - El Salvador No −→
USA Bahamas, The - Panama Yes -0.253 -0.943 2.792 −→
USA Bahamas, The - United States No ←→
USA El Salvador - Dominican Republic No −→
USA El Salvador - Ecuador Yes -0.934 -16.127 1.147 −→
USA El Salvador - United States No ←−
USA Liberia - Bahamas, The Yes -3.999 -38.647 -28.984 ←−
USA Liberia - Ecuador No −→
USA Liberia - El Salvador Yes -2.591 -27.541 -16.913 ←−
USA Liberia - Panama Yes -1.841 -10.987 -5.019 −→
USA Liberia - United States Yes -3.754 -33.093 -24.277 ←−
USA Panama - Ecuador Yes -1.015 -32.472 -0.467 ←→
USA Panama - El Salvador Yes -2.349 -9.442 -5.422 ←−
USA Panama - Guatemala Yes -0.419 -5.602 7.776 ←→
† Coefficient on country 1 normalized to 1 Continued on next page
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 15 – continued from previous page
Currency Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated βˆ†2 Z-score for Z-score for Granger
Union H0 : β2 = 0 H0 : β2 = −1 Causality∗
USA Panama - United States No ←−
UEMOA Burkina Faso - Benin No −→
UEMOA Burkina Faso - Cote d’Ivoire Yes -0.715 -67.245 26.851 ←→
UEMOA Burkina Faso - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.98 -24.463 0.497 −→
UEMOA Burkina Faso - Mali Yes -1.087 -51.225 -4.087 ←→
UEMOA Burkina Faso - Senegal No ←−
UEMOA Burkina Faso - Togo Yes -0.953 -28.747 1.419 ←−
UEMOA Cote d’Ivoire - Benin No ←−
UEMOA Cote d’Ivoire - Guinea-Bissau No ←−
UEMOA Guinea-Bissau - Benin Yes -0.859 -32.679 5.382 ←−
UEMOA Mali - Benin No ←−
UEMOA Mali - Cote d’Ivoire Yes -0.728 -28.343 10.577 ←→
UEMOA Mali - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.926 -24.962 2.004 ←→
UEMOA Niger - Benin No −→
UEMOA Niger - Cote d’Ivoire No ←−
UEMOA Niger - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.865 -22.958 3.593 −→
UEMOA Niger - Mali Yes -1.078 -30.607 -2.208 None
UEMOA Senegal - Benin No ←−
UEMOA Senegal - Cote d’Ivoire No ←→
UEMOA Senegal - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.774 -28.589 8.358 −→
UEMOA Senegal - Mali Yes -0.954 -46.877 2.276 −→
UEMOA Senegal - Niger No ←→
UEMOA Togo - Benin Yes -0.871 -27.789 4.112 ←−
UEMOA Togo - Cote d’Ivoire No −→
UEMOA Togo - Guinea-Bissau Yes -1.05 -21.352 -1.008 ←→
UEMOA Togo - Mali Yes -1.14 -31.983 -3.922 −→
UEMOA Togo - Niger No ←→
UEMOA Togo - Senegal No ←→
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